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An internal market for Security and Defence
The Kangaroo GroupThe
first direct election to the European Parliament took place in 1979.
At that time the ideas of what the role of this newly elected
institution should be varied widely. A large group of MEPs viewed the
Parliament as a constituent assembly and felt that the implementation
of a European Constitution should have priority. Another
group of MEPs held the view that the first aim should be to prove
that the Parliament was able to create clear advantages for the
citizens of Europe. This is where I met Dieter Rogalla. He
wholeheartedly espoused the abolition of superfluous border controls
between Member States of the European Union.
Living
in the border region between the Black Forest and the Vosges, I had
been pursuing the same goal. It was the most important message of my
election campaign. In my previous career I had made the rule for
myself that I would only invest my time in projects which had a more
than 50 per cent chance of success. In my view, the project of a
European Constitution did not meet this criterion at that time. Also,
I was 38 years old and felt that drawing up a Constitution was a task
for grey-haired men with long years of political experience. I
considered the abolition of border controls between Member States to
be the most important and also most realistic project for Europe at
this point in time. From this idea sprang an initially quite informal
group, established by myself, the British Conservative Basil de
Ferranti and the German Social Democrat Dieter Rogalla.
At
first this went under the not exactly attractive name of “working
group for the abolition of technical barriers to trade”. However,
we stood in direct competition to the “Crocodile Club”, an
association founded by Altiero Spinelli, which pursued the aim of
creating a European Constitution. In search of an even more appealing
animal name, Dieter Rogalla suggested the Kangaroo, which, even with
an empty pouch, is able to make great leaps forward. Given the fact
that the coffers were, in fact, empty at that time, this was an
important point.
The
goal of abolishing border controls was achieved in 1992 with the
single market programme and the Schengen Agreement. The next big
project for the Kangaroo Group was the single currency. Our most
important aim was to create the necessary preconditions for a stable
European currency, which depended on two factors: on the one hand,
the independence and stability orientation of the European Central
Bank, and on the other, a functioning debt brake for the Member
States. The independence and stability orientation of the Central
Bank were achieved, but sadly the debt brake in the guise of the
Maastricht criteria has not had sufficient effect.
Despite
this, a study published in “Die Welt”
ten years after the introduction of the single currency showed that
since the introduction of the Euro, the inflation rate has been lower
(1.5 per cent per year) than that of the German Mark (2.6 per cent
per year) during the time of its existence. However, the touchstone
for the Euro’s success will be when the economy recovers after the
crisis, and the European Central Bank has to raise the interest
rates to preserve monetary stability. Even
back then we believed that for a monetary union to achieve long-term
success it had to be part and parcel of a political union. Herein
lies, in my view, the biggest weakness of the European currency
system. We succeeded in creating a comprehensive monetary union, but
only the rudiments of a political union were realised.
A
political union requires a common foreign, security and defence
policy. Opinion polls have shown that this is what citizens actually
expect from the European Union: a life in peace and security. It is
for this reason that the Kangaroo Group set up a working group for
security and defence in 1999. Since
then, in many discussions on the subject of security in Europe, I
have repeatedly heard questions such as: “Who do we actually want
to defend ourselves against?”, and: “Is a defence policy still
necessary in today’s world?” This question was also posed by
Francis Fukuyama in an article written immediately after the collapse
of the Soviet Union.
But many people fail to take into account that while there has been
peace between the Member States of the European Union since 1945,
there have been more than 200 wars in other parts of the world, which
have killed millions of men, women and children. The
European Security Strategy, ratified by the European Council in 2003
and revised in 2008, analyses the threats we face today, as well as
the values and interests of the European Union and its citizens.
This
analysis begins with the dangers of international terrorism, weapons
of mass destruction and the potential risk that chemical, biological
or nuclear weapons could end up in the hands of terrorists or
irresponsible states. A
further security hazard is civil war amongst our near neighbours with
direct consequences for the European Union. In
addition to that there are natural disasters, such as those in Japan
and Haiti, which necessitate common action. A
European security policy also involves the protection of the outer
borders of the Union against trade in drugs, weapons and people. Our
energy supply and our trade routes also need to be secured. New
threats are arising in the shape of attacks on our computer networks.
The fact that our economy and our entire sustenance depend on these
networks also constitutes a considerable risk.
Another
frequently asked question is why security and defence should be a
concern of the European Union. When,
in the spring of 1993, I heard about the massacre in Srebrenica, just
like many of my colleagues in the European Parliament I was ashamed
that Europe, which seemed to be so powerful, had been unable to
prevent this bloodshed. In that situation, where all the other means
had failed, the only possible response was the intervention of armed
forces. However, the European Union had no means of taking such
action at the time. In the end, it was our American allies who solved
the problem for us, while the Nation States of Europe had failed.
That
was when many of us realized that security and defence inevitably had
to be responsibilities of the European Union. The European Union
should be able to secure peace and to prevent genocide and crimes
against humanity at least in its direct vicinity.
Even
today we have to ask ourselves why the security problems of the
European
Union, with its 500 million citizens and a Gross National Product of
over 10,000 billion euro, have to be solved by 300 million Americans
with an economic output of the same order of magnitude.
What has happened so far?
The
first decision
preparing for a European Security and Defence Policy came about in an
unusual configuration. Traditionally it had been France and Germany
who had developed European initiatives together. In St. Malo in 1998,
it was France and the United Kingdom who called for a European
identity in security matters.
This
led to the decisions
of the European Council in Cologne and Helsinki to make available to
the European Union military forces of up to 60,000 persons for crisis
management.
This
was
the basis on which Javier Solana, then High Representative for the
Common Foreign and Security Policy, developed the European Union’s
Security Strategy which is still valid today.
This
document
begins with the statement that no single country is able to tackle
today’s complex problems on its own and that as a union of states
producing a quarter of the world’s Gross National Product the
European Union should be ready to share in the responsibility for
global security and building a better world. Further,
it states
that 45 million people die every year of hunger and malnutrition, and
that security is a precondition of development. The
most important characteristics
of the European Security Strategy are its comprehensive approach, the
close cooperation of civilian and military instruments of crisis
management, and the aim of a world order based on an effective
multilateral system in the framework of the Charter of the United
Nations. This was Europe’s answer to the United States’ strategy
back then, which emphasised first and foremost the so-called
coalitions of the willing. Today,
more
than twenty civilian and military interventions have been carried out
based on these decisions. To make such interventions possible, the
necessary structures had to be put in place. During
the initial years, it was principally
Javier Solana, as Secretary General of the Council and High
Representative for the Common Foreign and Security Policy, who lent a
face to this new field of European politics. The
European
Parliament instituted a Subcommittee on Security and Defence which I
chaired with the goal to provide a parliamentary scrutiny in
cooperation with my counterparts of the Parliaments of the Member
States. The
creation of the
European External Action Service, based on the Treaty of Lisbon, has
provided a new instrument for the implementation of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy led by Baroness Ashton. The
list of tasks indicates the comprehensive approach of the European
Unions Defence and Security Policy. It
includes joint disarmament measures, humanitarian aid and crisis
response, military advice and support, conflict prevention and
peacekeeping, as well as combat missions in the context of crisis
management.
Operations
undertaken in the name of the European Security and Defence Policy
demonstrate the whole spectrum of security policy responsibilities,
ranging from rule of law and observer missions to the deployment of
armed forces under the leadership of the European Union.
In
Kosovo
it is NATO which takes military responsibility. The European Union’s
contribution does not consist in the deployment of troops, but in
promoting the introduction of the rule of law, especially by training
police and setting up an independent judiciary. A further example of
the European Union’s help is the training of security personnel in
Afghanistan.
A
good example of the combination
of different mechanisms of security policy was the European Union’s
response to the crisis in Georgia in August 2008. On the one hand
there was the diplomatic work of the President of Council, Nicolas
Sarkozy, in Tiflis and Moscow, which led to a ceasefire, and on the
other, the deployment of 300 observers in the crisis region. Their
task is to analyse the situation, monitor the return of refugees, and
to contribute to easing tension and stabilizing relations between the
conflicting parties.
Nevertheless,
this also showed the limits of the European Union’s capacities. The
deployment of observers was only possible by using available
resources outside of their normal scope; and during a visit to
Georgia I noticed that protective gear, armoured vehicles, and even
binoculars were in short supply. These are not exactly ideal
preconditions for an observation mission. It may be an idea for the
future to create a pool of basic equipment, which can be used at any
time for missions of this kind.
Examples
of
the involvement of armed forces under the European Union’s Security
and Defence Policy are the missions in the Congo, in Chad and in the
Gulf of Aden.
In
the Congo, armed forces were deployed under the leadership of the
European Union, at the request of the United Nations, in order to
monitor the elections. It was a clearly defined mission with a
definite end date, and it was carried out successfully. A very
explosive situation - an attack by governmental troops on the leader
of the opposition - was defused by the intervention of the European
armed forces.
Since
December
2008 European Union ships have been patrolling the Gulf of Aden as
part of Operation Atalanta, to deter and disrupt piracy in the region
and protect the European Union’s trade routes. Despite these
efforts, Somalian pirates detained 31 ships with more than 700
sailors in January 2011.
The
European
Union’s involvement in Chad from January 2008 to March 2009 aimed
to protect the refugee and displaced persons’ camps along the
border with the Sudan, which were constantly attacked by mounted
militias from Darfur.
During
the mission in Chad, it happened for the first time that a
soldier was killed on duty in an operation of the European Union. He
was sergeant Gilles Polin, 28 years old. At the memorial service in
Bayonne, the European Union was represented by Javier Solana and
myself, France by Nicolas Sarkozy, Hervé Morin and Michèle
Alliot-Marie. The salute for the fallen soldier by his regiment left
a lasting impression on me.
What
of the future?
Inspections
of armed
forces under the leadership of the European Union regularly reveal
how variable the quality of equipment between different national
contingents is.
We
should bear in mind that the
27 Member States of the European Union spend around 200 billion euro
per year on defence, almost half of the defence expenditure of the
United States. Nevertheless, after the Balkan wars our American
friends told us that the efficiency of our contribution lay somewhere
between 10 and 20 per cent.
In
view of the fact that the
international financial crisis added strong pressure on national
defence budgets, we should consider how closer cooperation could
improve the situation.
To
start with,
it is clear that both civilian and military interventions often
require the same resources. Intelligence, telecommunication and
navigation, as well as air, sea and land transportation are vital not
only for military missions but also for interventions after a
tsunami. We must therefore assess where existing cooperation can be
strengthened and whether the European Union’s budget could make a
contribution.
Budgeting
and information
are the fundamental means of control which a parliament has at its
disposal. The European Parliament has used these options to the best
of its abilities. The regular intelligence visits to the crisis
regions in the Balkans, the Congo, Chad and Somalia were the most
important part of this. They enabled the European Parliament to give
an opinion before decisions on the use of armed forces were taken by
the Council.
This
experience also prompts me to contradict those who consider
parliamentary control of defence policy as fundamentally problematic,
because parliaments move too slowly. As far as the European
Parliament is concerned, I can say from experience that we had the
time to deliberate and to vote on a well considered resolution before
the Council took a final decision on any of the military
interventions of the European Union so far.
Besides,
the control lies with the parliaments
of the Member States. It is now a matter of developing new forms of
collaboration between the parliaments of the Member States and the
European Parliament in the field of security and defence.
Outlook
The
strongest argument
for the further development of the European Security and Defence
Policy is the empty coffers of the Member States. We can no longer
afford to reinvent the wheel once, let alone twenty-seven times.
In
my view, the
recent initiative of the European Defence Agency offers a realistic
approach. The idea is that Member States first examine in which areas
they want to have resources at their own exclusive disposal, and in
which areas they are prepared to collaborate or relinquish their own
capabilities.
This
could bring about new
joint initiatives, whereby it would be recommendable to concentrate
on projects of a size beyond the means of individual Member States.
In addition, we should investigate further options for shared use of
resources and for savings through joint technical standards and
certifications.
Those
countries which house
multinational troops such as the Eurocorps should consider placing
these units at the permanent disposal of the European Union,
eventually in the context of a permanent structured cooperation.
What
we need now is a wider
public debate on these issues. We must review existing structures and
capabilities to see whether they meet the demands of the 21st
century.
Whether
or
not this will one day lead to a European army is a question of
political will. It is therefore, above all, a question to be put to
the citizens of the European Union.
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